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Global Poverty
The Co-Production of Knowledge and Politics
A S U N C I Ó N  L E R A  S T  C L A I R
University of Bergen
abstract This article argues that insights from the field of social
studies of science and technology are relevant for assessing the highly
politicized and contested knowledge for development and the
eradication of global poverty elaborated by the World Bank. The
World Bank, which has become a transnational expert institution, is
best characterized as a ‘site of co-production’, producing both
knowledge and social orders. Such a perspective helps in unveiling
problems related to expertise and problems of delegation fundamental
in relations between politics and knowledge. At the same time,
applying insights from the social studies of science and technology
provides an explanatory framework for knowledge-based science advice
and suggestions for increasing the salience, credibility and legitimacy
of such knowledge. The article calls for institutional innovations that
may lead to dialogue and a more transparent and accountable debate
among competing knowledge claims and political visions within and
outside transnational expert bodies.
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Introduction
Knowledge for development and the eradication of global poverty is
primarily in the hands of a transnational expert institution, the World Bank
(the Bank). Under pressure from critics on all sides, the Bank has responded
by emphasizing its role as producer of policy-oriented knowledge for devel-
opment. Yet views and prospects announced by the Bank are increasingly
contested by critics from both left and right, from the local to the global
arena. Critics tend to dismiss this institution’s knowledge, arguing it is
politicized and simply a tool for the spread of neoliberal economic global-
ization benefiting global elites. Defenders of the Bank claim such arguments
are misguided and, assuming the objectivity and neutrality of economic
science, they argue the Bank possesses the best experts and knowledge base in
the fields of development and poverty reduction, knowledge used by most
other UN institutions and donors. This debate is not productive in terms of
improving knowledge for development and the eradication of poverty, nor
does it disentangle the circularity created by the expert institutionalization
processes we see in the Bank (St Clair, 2006). A lack of engaged criticism on
the side of academics leads to a fruitless and highly politicized debate rather
than to a sustained investigation into the ways in which knowledge is sorted
out from non-knowledge and the sources of valid expertise. Although a body
of literature is emerging assessing ideas and knowledge about global poverty
in transnational settings it is so far a very limited field (see, for example, Bøas
and McNeill, 2004; Deacon, 2004; Emmerij et al., 2001; Gould and
Marcussen, 2004; Stone, 2003; UNRISD, 2004). Often the discussion about
knowledge at the transnational level is too focused on the notion of epistemic
communities, but the problem of global poverty is far more complex than that
captured by the notion of epistemic communities. For example, we face
multiple claims to expertise that need to be evaluated and assessed. And
although I do not refer to this body of work, authors addressing development
as discourse offer few constructive alternatives; while millions of lives in poor
countries depend on the knowledge and policy recommendations issued by
expert bodies like the Bank.
This article argues that insights from the field of social studies of science
and technology (S&TS), which have offered fruitful analyses of other expert
bodies dealing with highly politicized and contested scientific knowledge for
policy-making, are relevant for assessing knowledge for development and
eradicating global poverty; relevant for global social policy. A transnational
expert institution like the Bank is best characterized as a regulatory agency, as
a ‘site of co-production’ producing both knowledge and social orders. Such a
perspective unveils problems related to expertise and problems of delegation
fundamental in relations between politics and knowledge such as moral
hazard and adverse selection. At the same time, applying insights from S&TS
provides an explanatory framework for knowledge-based science advice and
suggestions for increasing the salience, credibility and legitimacy of such
knowledge. Following the example of research on other highly politicized
global problems such as climate change, the article calls for institutional
innovations that would lead to dialogue among competing knowledge and
governance claims. The aim is to open up a space for debating the possibility
of more salient, credible and legitimate knowledge about global poverty,
leading to more democratic and accountable knowledge production, and to a
more transparent vision of the world orders entangled in such knowledge.
The first section of the article summarizes some of the problems related to
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the institutionalization of expertise. It highlights the constructed character of
knowledge about poverty, including quantitative knowledge, and presents
some of the disagreements on knowledge about global poverty. These are not
only empirical disagreements, but also epistemological, political and ethical.
The next section presents the notions of boundary work, boundary objects
and the idiom of co-production as insights to analyse processes of knowledge
formation in transnational expert institutions. The third section introduces
and applies the notion of boundary organization – an institution straddling
the shifting divide between science in the making and politics in the making
– as a tool to address the problems of delegation in the Bank. The article
concludes by proposing the investigation of institutional innovations to
regulate the production of knowledge about global poverty along the lines of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Knowledge about Global Poverty: Between Science in the
Making and Politics in the Making
Rather than a self-evident process, establishing expertise on complex and ill-
structured social problems such as global poverty is beset with problems.
Expert claims are usually determined by the interrelations between audiences,
experts and the legitimacy of knowledge. But in many cases, these inter-
relations are a mere circular process where experts seek legitimacy of their
knowledge claims among audiences that have been either created by or are
dependent on the same experts that seek legitimacy in the first place. This is
common among expert institutions, as their formation and evolution have
often depended on their building up a new field of knowledge (Turner, 2003).
I have argued elsewhere that this is also the case of the World Bank, a state-
like transnational expert institution with discretionary powers appropriate to
political actors that generates the same audiences that legitimize its
knowledge claims (St Clair, 2006). These legitimating audiences are often
other institutions that have discretionary powers such as for example the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the governments from client
countries. In addition, unlike other experts, the Bank’s staff do have discre-
tionary powers, for example to withdraw a loan, to cancel out a development
project and even to determine the credit worthiness of a whole country and
thus the financial future of many people.
Global poverty is highly contested and politicized. It is an ill-structured and
complex social problem able to be defined in different ways, the problem
space changing with time and location, and the causal arguments being
slippery and difficult to establish. Poverty definitions and assessments are not
accounts of facts, but rather ‘fact-surrogates’, well-structured parts of an ill-
structured and complex whole (St Clair, 2006). Fact-surrogates are partial
pictures drawn with the cognitive tools of particular disciplines. In the case of
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global poverty, the cognitive values of economics such as quantification,
simplicity and measurability, just to name the most relevant, are clearly
dominant (St Clair, 2004a). Any non-economist working in the World Bank
is often forced to present their data according to these cognitive values if they
wish their findings to be taken as knowledge. The most we can say about the
current status of knowledge about global poverty is that it reflects a ‘consensus
among certain scientists’ rather than a ‘scientific consensus’. The distinction
is important, as the first warns us of the tentative character of knowledge and
thus opens up space for debate and discussion, whereas the latter tends to
convey a more permanent and objective knowledge judgement that only other
expert claims may be able to challenge. As Bruno Latour (2003) argues,
acknowledging the partially constructed character of knowledge is the best
protection against all sorts of fundamentalisms, including market and
postmodern relativist fundamentalisms. In addition, not only are descriptions
of what poverty is value laden, but so also are prescriptions as to what are the
best possible ways to reduce it. Contrary to common understandings, even
quantitative knowledge is simultaneously knowledge and action; social
indicators, for example, are fact-surrogates rather than objective data fully
capturing reality.
One of the main reasons offered by economists for the supremacy of their
knowledge is their capacity to offer explanations and predictions about
poverty that are measurable, comparable and able to offer reliable guidance
for policy-making as well as effective strategies. However, sociologists of
knowledge and historians have substantially challenged such simplification
and warned about trusting numbers too much (Porter, 1996). According to
Alain Desrosiéres’ (1998) The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical
Reasoning, since the 18th century the history of economic sciences was shaped
by the debates between the construction of nation-states and their relations to
markets. As different ideologies about the relations between these two
institutions developed (mercantilism, liberalism, Keynesianism, neoliberal-
ism), statistical observations were shaped by them, and were causes of the
ways these ideologies developed. Desrosiéres’ modern sociology of know-
ledge unveils the continuum between science being made and science being
applied and the interconnections between the administrative requirements of
institutions (the state, or today’s transnational institutions) and the production
of specific facts on which to base policy decisions. Statistical knowledge,
according to Desrosiéres, bases its legitimacy on its capacity to offer decision-
makers objective facts on which to base policy-making, but the social facts
measured by statistical reasoning can be thought of simultaneously as existing
and as a convention. This means that statistical knowledge on and related to
poverty policies or social policy is science in the making. The aggregates,
averages and estimates on which policy-makers base their decisions are
surrogate facts – real and constructed at the same time – created to facilitate
decision processes that are themselves ill-structured, uncertain and often
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risky, and to justify the predictions of such polices. The same applies to other
types of knowledge about poverty.
Making transparent the characteristics outlined above is crucial for a
democratic and representative debate about how to define global poverty,
what its causes are and how to address them. It is important to deepen our
understandings of whose expert knowledge claims are legitimate and which
audiences legitimize those claims; and to identify possible circular dynamics
between expertise, audiences and the legitimacy of that expertise.
Take, for example, the question whether global poverty has increased or
decreased. Statistical data showing decreases in poverty reinforce existing
poverty policies, whereas the opposite would discredit them. In recent years,
this issue has become the battleground of economic neoliberal globalization;
those defending the openness of markets using decreasing poverty numbers as
their main evidence for the well-functioning of globalization and rejecting
critics as non-experts unable to understand the theories underlying such
processes. A clear answer to current global poverty trends, thus, is of the
utmost importance, but I do not think this is only an empirical matter; rather,
assessing poverty trends is an epistemic, political and moral issue as well.
While citizens in advanced economies are told by press summaries that
poverty has been decreasing since the 1980s, a closer look into the problems
of global poverty knowledge formation shows us that we really do not know
whether this is the case or not. According to the Human Development Report
2003 (UNDP, 2003), which provides the most extensive effort to measure the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a comprehensive and reliable
statistical global survey of severe poverty, basic living conditions and basic
social indicators has never been conducted; there are no comparable and
reliable data about global poverty trends; in addition, other MDGs indicators
and the data most actors use are being challenged as misleading and unreliable
even by some of the very institutions that actually use the data.
The problem is not only this knowledge gap, but also that there is an
ongoing politically and ethically grounded methodological debate, of which
we hear little, outside the expert elites. In regard to income poverty, the
methodological debate acknowledged in the Human Development Report 2003
refers to the poverty line choice and elaboration, about the reliability of data
on poverty increases. These debates are intrinsically related to the reliability
of the economic policies prescribed to reduce poverty; to whether global-
ization works or does not work for the poor; whether high wealth polarization
within and across countries matters in these debates; and what to do and why
about all these complicated and intrinsically related matters. That is,
questions about trends in global poverty are epistemological, political and
ethical as much as empirical. As methodologies are essentially conceptual
frameworks, with their own epistemological foundations, concepts of poverty
and sets of methods (Kanji, 2003), a purely empirical approach to the problem
is clearly insufficient. For example, questions about increases in poverty
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depend on what people look at: some people may look at absolute numbers
and others may look at relative numbers. The choice is made through the
cognitive values of economics that assure neutrality with regard to population
scale (Chakravarty et al., 2002). Another substantially important datum to
evaluate global poverty trends commonly left out because of the cognitive
values of economics is the people who have actually died due to poverty-
related causes.1 Similarly, Pogge and Reddy (2003) claim that the Bank’s
estimates of global poverty and its trends are neither meaningful nor reliable,
leading to an understatement of the actual numbers of people living in
extreme poverty.
Debates about the flaws of methodologies and the role that the cognitive
authority of economic science has are crucial for appropriate poverty policies.
Jan Vandemoortele (2002) warns us that one of the most dangerous conse-
quences of using the artificial poverty line elaborated by the Bank – which
relies on averages and aggregates – is that it leads to unsound deductions
between the relationship of increases in growth and a consequent almost one
to one reduction of poverty. Bank experts, who argue in this direction, support
their claims by logarithmic regressions that show how poverty trends lower as
economic growth raises. But according to Vandemoortele, this is fallacious
reasoning. ‘The moment one ceases to realize that the average is an abstract
concept, one can fall victim to the fallacy of “misplaced concreteness”. The
fallacy can lead to unwarranted conclusions about concrete realities – based
on deduction from abstractions, not on real observations.’ Vandemoortele
adds, ‘the fact that the income of the poor rises one-for-one with overall
per capita income may be statistically correct, but it is not necessarily true’
(Vandemoortele, 2002: 9; emphasis added), a warning already made by
Desrosiéres (1998). Furthermore, Vandermoortele offers worrisome data
about China’s poverty reduction, often used as the most clear example that
neoliberal globalization works for the poor. This calls for further research.
Perhaps the most worrisome claim about the misleading role of an
uncritical faith in one’s discipline’s cognitive values is made by Robert Wade
(2004), who argues that the reason why economists have not taken seriously
what now starts to be undeniably clear, that wealth polarizes towards those
who are already wealthy leading to deepening levels of poverty and to
increases in inequalities – what may be called the law of decreasing returns –
is because of economists’ need to submit to established cognitive values of
quantification. As Summer (2004) argues, econometrics has become the most
important source for ‘evidence’ in knowledge about global poverty.
Disagreements are also clearly related to political views, and in particular to
debates as to whether globalization is or is not good for the poor. While at the
transnational level we see an emphasis on a multidimensional view of poverty,
some European scholars are questioning to what extent this multidimensional
view is due more to the need to offer broad definitions that may satisfy the
current pressures from civil society rather than to expressing what needs to be
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done to eradicate poverty. Several poverty researchers warn that multi-
dimensional views of poverty are deepening disagreements (Gordon and
Townsend, 2000; Townsend, 2002). For example, Townsend accuses multi-
lateral institutions like the Bank and the G8 nations of endorsing misguided
policy choices and claims that disagreements about poverty are used to hide
political interests in international poverty reduction. He calls for the elabo-
ration of a transparently elaborated definition of poverty and a measuring
system, the result of the common work of poverty researchers, donors and
transnational institutions (Townsend, 2002). Townsend argues for a more
narrow ‘scientific’ definition of poverty that would allow for proper
comparisons and effective policy. This new call has now become a ‘Statement
by European Social Scientists’. By making transparent the tentative character
of the agreement, what these researchers and policy-makers are demanding is
an ‘agreement among scientists’ that recognizes the fact-surrogate character
of global poverty and the ill-structured context of policy decisions; arguably
conscious of the simultaneous role this has in the making of global politics. In
addition, Townsend warns of the shortcomings of the methodological
territorialism that dominates research performed by the Bank – which looks
at poverty as a problem enclosed by the geography of nation-states – and
reminds us that there is a lot of relevant knowledge in European countries as
to how best to deal with poverty and social policy; this knowledge deserves to
be spread out or at least considered as evidence relevant for developing and
less developed countries. A similar line of argument is presented by David
Held (2004).
Ravi Kanbur, former lead editor of the Bank’s World Development Report
2000–1 on poverty, claims that he found substantial disagreements about the
content and theoretical framework of the report among various stakeholders.
These disagreements are related to values, frameworks, perspectives and
ideals of what the global community should look like, issues common to
highly complex and ill-structured global problems. Kanbur warns that
‘inappropriate simplifying and hardening of policy messages, either as a way
of constraining the operation of an aid agency, or as a negotiating device
because of the fear that nuancing will be seen as a sign of weakness in policy
debate, will only serve to polarize the debate further and will not be conducive
to broad based dialogue’ (Kanbur, 2001: 16).
All disagreements highlighted here can be addressed by looking at what
counts as knowledge and who counts as an expert and who and what do not.
In turn, these disagreements are political debates as much as empirical or
epistemological ones, and driven by ethical visions of what ought to be an
optimal social order; they are about both knowledge and action. If
knowledge-based policy-making inhabits the divide of knowledge in the
making and politics in the making, and given that knowledge is in the hands,
primarily, of expert bureaucracies where there is a circular dynamic between
expertise, audiences and the legitimacy of that expertise, common resources
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to guarantee the relevance, quality and accuracy of knowledge, such as
standard peer review processes, are insufficient. Following insights from
S&TS may help in interpreting and accounting for the complex problem of
global poverty and perhaps provide a way to move forward towards a
transparent and more democratic debate.
Transnational Expert Institutions: Boundary Work and the
Idiom of Co-Production
According to the literature on social science studies, one of the most
fundamental ways in which knowledge about social facts is formulated is by
making a distinction between what is knowledge or scientific and what is not
knowledge, not a scientific judgement. Rather than a matter of identifying
cognitive authority, what demarcates science from non-science is not a
particular set of specific characteristics but rather a combination of
contingencies and strategic behaviour referred to as boundary work (Gieryn,
1995, 1999; Jasanoff, 1990, 2004). Boundary work views science as partly
constructed. Science is not the outcome of unmediated enquiry into the world
but rather it is a social and value-laden highly complex enterprise that involves
many actors besides scientists. The notion of boundary work aims to explain
linkages between different social worlds and the negotiations that are part of
what appears objective and value-free codified knowledge. This notion helps
in the understanding of the complicated aspects of knowledge-based policy-
making processes, as Jasanoff (1990, 2004) has shown in her analysis of the
roles of some US advisory committees and the interactions these have
between politicians and scientists. Given the boundaries between science and
non-science are provisional and ambiguous, Jasanoff argues, the more we blur
them the more transparent science policy becomes. Policy is an issue made
between different social worlds and demands the possibility of responding to
different interests and diverse goals and ends. Critics of constructivist views
may argue that viewing scientific knowledge as boundary work opens the door
to dangerous relativism, given that constructivism questions the rationality
and objectivity claims of science. But knowledge-based policy, Jasanoff and
Gieryn claim, is a hybrid product, where the more politicians and scientists
try to separate their domains of expertise, the more difficult it becomes to
decide policy. And as stated earlier, acknowledging the partial character of
knowledge about complex and ill-structured issues – concepts and approaches
reflect fact-surrogates rather than objective truths – may be a way to avoid
fundamentalisms and to open up space for debate and deliberation. Science in
practice is not the same as forming knowledge within academic environments.
Economic science does not solve many problems experts encounter on the
ground; not even when simply trying to collect data.
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For example, fact-finding missions from either the World Bank or the IMF
tend to be seen as offering the same types of certainty and objectivity as
economic theories offered in academic theoretical publications. Yet there are
often massive difficulties in establishing the economic situation of a country.
IMF or Bank missions are messy and complex fact-finding exercises, often
leading to uncertain and even often risky guesses experts are forced to make
due to the lack of data or contradictory statistical reports of different
ministries in client countries. The outcome of such missions is not objective
science, but rather the result of negotiations experts make with people whose
knowledge judgements they deem are most reliable and accurate and with
whom they are able to establish social relations. Numbers often end up being
interpreted rather than collected; such interpretations conform more to
particular circumstances experts find themselves immersed in or simply those
they are able to get because of their social skills. As Richard Harper (2000)
argues in his detailed account of an IMF mission, these processes are best seen
as ‘social processes’. The results are as much the outcome of a combination of
contingencies and strategic behaviour as the outcome of applied expertise;
that is, building expert knowledge is the result of boundary work. Similarly,
the expert work consultants or Bank staff end up performing in client
countries is similarly messy and ill-structured. In the words of a consultant
trying to establish food security in Sierra Leone, this was more about
detective work and negotiation; about sorting out what was relevant
knowledge from what was not (Griffiths, 2003). The boundary terminology
reflects then not only the sorting out of knowledge and non-knowledge, but
also the interactions between knowledge and politics.
Experts need to be able to link not only knowledge and action, research and
policy, but also diverse social worlds often with competing and diverse
interests and concerns. Boundary work is, then, not only about negotiations
and contingencies, but also requires a common language, a meeting point
where stakeholders of these messy and complex processes of building
knowledge can meet. From this perspective, ideas informing policy are best
seen as ‘boundary objects’, analytical concepts that transform boundary work
into a more comprehensive and perhaps fruitful process. Boundary objects
‘are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the several
parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity
across sites. These boundary objects allow members of different communities
to work together around them, and yet maintain their disparate identities’
(Star and Griesemer, 1989: 393). Boundary objects can be ‘things like an
article in a research journal, in which unsubstantiated claims may represent
research fraud to a congressional investigator, but merely unwarranted
speculation to a researcher colleague’ (Guston, 2000: 29). Boundary objects
can be expanded into sets, as Joan Fujimura (1992) claims, and become
‘standardized packages’. ‘Standardized packages are used by researchers to
define a conceptual and technical work space which is less abstract, less ill-
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structured, less ambiguous and less amorphous’ (Fujimura, 1992: 169). Such
boundary tools are interfaces among different agents and connect different
social worlds, emphasizing the collaboration of sets of actors in their desire to
achieve results satisfactory to all while each maintains their own integrity and
their respective social worlds.
In short, the idiom of co-production reminds us that knowledge both
embeds and is embedded in social identities, other institutions, narratives and
representations. From this viewpoint, ways of knowing the world are insep-
arably linked to the ways in which people seek to organize and control it. An
important goal of the ‘idiom of co-production’ is that it seeks to address the
interrelated constructions of both knowledge and governance systems, taking
a comprehensive view of the relations between knowledge, culture and power
(Jasanoff, 2004). What distinguishes knowledge from non-knowledge are not
only cognitive qualities but also sets of contingencies and strategic behaviours
best addressed as boundary work. Determining valid economic knowledge in
developing countries is often more a matter of social skills and improvisation
than a mere implementation of academic economics; like determining the
carcinogenic levels of food additives, quantification of food production and
provisions for possible food security, just to take an example, requires linking
such knowledge with structures of power, culture and the wider social worlds.
This helps in addressing the problems of delegation fundamental in relations
between politics and knowledge.
Boundary Organizations
A good example of how expert institutions have minimized problems of
delegation and attempted to stabilize the complexities of boundary work is
offered by David Guston (2000) in a detailed account of the history of US
science policy. Guston takes the boundary approach as his point of departure
to conceptualize the transformations that have occurred in some US
institutions entrusted with knowledge-based public policy-making. The idea
that the relations between scientists and politicians is analogous to a social
contract – first scientists formulate knowledge which then is passed on to
policy-makers who decide to use or not to use such knowledge – is an obsolete
assumption. In practice, Guston argues, the need to overcome the problems
posed by the delegatory nature of research has led expert institutions towards
a model he calls, ‘collaborative assurance’. This model is characterized by
accountability controls able to manage, on the one hand, the integrity of
scientific findings, and, on the other, the productivity of research for those
funding it. Institutions such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
Guston argues, have acknowledged the social and political content of their
work. Taking as a point of departure the notion of boundary object, Guston
claims that institutions that have moved to a regime of mutual collaboration
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– like the NIH – have eventually become the boundary object themselves,
they can be seen as boundary organizations, sites of co-production of knowledge
and politics able to avoid the politicization of science as much as the undue
influence of scientists on political decisions.
According to Guston, the delegation from governments to the scientific
community is an instance of principal–agent relations. Even though we
cannot always identify single individuals in these roles, institutions and
legislative bodies perform these roles and thus can be claimed to have
principal–agent relations. This delegatory relation is subject to two problems:
adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection because the principal
lacks knowledge and thus has difficulty selecting an agent; moral hazard
because the agent may have an incentive to cheat or act unacceptably. The
different ways to solve these two problems are used by Guston (2000) to
describe different science regimes in the US, of which the roles performed by
boundary organizations is the latest form to control these problems derived
from asymmetries of knowledge. But for Guston, principal–agent theory is
simply one more tool in his analysis of science policy:
. . . the pattern of principal–agent mirrors the division between political and
scientific actors, and the asymmetric information seems to reinforce the belief of
realists in science’s claim to the consensual production of falsifiable knowledge
under unique normative arrangements. For this reason the complementarity of
constructivist work is crucial to demonstrate the contingencies and nuance of these
distinctions. (Guston, 2000: 147–8)
Divisions between agents and principals are as blurred as the divisions
between scientists and politicians. What may seem an easy two-party
relationship dissolves into complex relations in which, for example, principals
are patrons of sets of actors who then become principals to other agents.
Researchers need agents of their own to help them achieve the goals
demanded by policy-makers. It is here where the role of boundary objects and
standardized packages becomes crucial. Ideas need to offer more than mere
packaged knowledge; they must be able, on the one hand, to speak to their
patrons, and, on the other hand, to talk to their scientific peers. In order to
guarantee integrity and productivity, there is a need for dual agency. And the
boundary organization is the expression of this dual agency.
A boundary organization offers a solution to principal–agent problems in
science because it offers different lines of accountability to the worlds of
science and politics. The dual agency of the boundary organization is what
makes it a site of co-production, the simultaneous production of knowledge
and social order. ‘Boundary organizations are involved in co-production in
two ways. They facilitate collaboration between scientists and nonscientists;
and they create a combined scientific order’ (Guston, 2000: 149). The notion
of co-production is now becoming a central analytical tool in furthering
debates about the democratization of scientific knowledge (Jasanoff, 2004).
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The crucial role of these institutions is, then, to assure the stability between
the domains of science and politics, to speak to principals in both domains and
to do so in a way that integrity and productivity can be assured. Speaking
differently to different audiences, boundary organizations can bring stability
to usually controversial issues. Furthermore, working for more than one
principal, boundary organizations may be a way to avoid the politization of
science as well as the scientification of politics. Science policy deals with issues
that are highly controversial, and subject to contesting views that would lead
to contesting policy recommendations. Jasanoff (1990) illustrates this point in
regards the role of the Health Effects Institute (HEI). ‘In an environment in
which government scientists and industry scientists are often on opposing
sides of interpreting evidence about environmental health and safety, HEI’s
experience suggests the benefits of constructing dual agency. Because both
government and industry fund HEI, neither party could productively accuse
it of being captive of the other. Supplemented by two peer review committees,
one of which reviewed research proposals and the other which reviewed
research results, HEI has been relatively successful in constructing a
reputation of objectivity’ (Guston, 2000: 151).
There are substantial lessons to draw from approaches that assess
knowledge elaborated or endorsed by multilateral institutions like the Bank.
Boundary elements are already in place. Ideas in the UN system often work
as boundary concepts. A good example is the twin notion of human
development-capability defended by the Human Development Report Office
of the United Nations Development Programme (St Clair, 2004b). Notions
such as social capital, capabilities, empowerment and many others are needed
in boundary work so that they become part of the knowledge systems of these
institutions. In the process they become distorted and transformed, often to
altogether different fact-surrogates. The combination of the definition
‘income poverty’ with the methodology to account for poverty using the ‘1
US$ a day’ could be seen as a standardized package. Disagreements such as
the ones outlined earlier in this article often lead to debates as to what is and
what is not knowledge, and often certain hegemonic fact-surrogates (inclu-
ding particular statistical trends) are presented as the only scientific truths
because of obsolete social contract assumptions that presume the linearity
between knowledge and policy-making.
The boundary work of the complex set of institutions that form the Bank,
however, is highly complicated. Although some ideas are hegemonic (Bøas
and McNeill, 2004), and there are diverse epistemic communities within the
Bank that compete to get their views accepted as knowledge and translated
into policies, these analytical tools are not enough to capture such complexity.
It is best to talk in terms of diverse levels of boundary work among competing
groups using different boundary objects or interpreting them in diverse ways.
As Stephen Hilgartner elaborates in his study of the struggles over the
credibility of science advice in the US National Academies of Science, the
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sorting of knowledge and non-knowledge and the ways in which the authority
of experts is created, contested and maintained is similar to the performance
of a drama. Such performance is often dedicated to particular audiences, those
who in the end legitimize the performer’s knowledge judgements. We can talk
about front-stage (public) and back-stage (non-disclosed) boundary works
operating in parallel and often leading to diverse policy suggestions
(Hilgartner, 2000). It is even possible to identify a heterogeneous and flexible
view of the boundaries between knowledge and politics, and thus attempt to
identify various patterns of science–policy boundaries coexisting within the
same institutional framework (Halffman and Hoppe, 2004).
Multilateral institutions are arenas to coordinate the social and economic
relations between North and South governments, in theory bridging the
interests of both types of countries (donors and recipients). This is the sim-
plest sense of principal–agent relations in development aid. Multilateralism is
viewed precisely as a bridge to coordinate relations between countries with
different powers. In principle, multilateralism avoids the use of bilateral aid as
a tool for pursuing the foreign policy interests of donors. The multilateral
institutions are said to be the arena where those interests are set aside, thus
enabling their ‘neutral’ coordination. We can talk also about a dual principal–
agent relation where both donors and recipients are principals: donor-
principal and recipient-principal; but there is another relation in which the
multilateral is the principal and the recipient country is the agent. In the case
of the Bank, the member countries are divided into those who mostly give
funds and those who mostly receive them, yet all belong to the structure of the
organization and all must make contributions if they are to receive funding.
Given that since its establishment in 1945 the Bank was conceived as an agent
of all member countries and their constituencies, it may be said that both
donors and recipients are principals (Ellerman, 2002; Kapur, 2002). Further-
more, in-house research funded with money from donor countries generates
a dual role for the multilateral itself, where it becomes an agent of the donor
country for its in-house research. Or we can interpret such in-house research
capacity as a principal–agent relation within the multilateral itself, as when
some departments endow funds to others that act as grantee institutions (the
research departments). A last way in which we can speak of principal–agent
relations is regarding the widely spread use of external consultants. The Bank
acts as a principal funding research realized by agents either independent of
or in academia. This tentative cartography of roles can be expanded if we
include the actual principal–agent relations as they seem to occur within the
framework of global economics and global politics by including the role of
civil society organizations, the private sector or financial markets.
These complex relations are summarized in Table 1.
It is important to distinguish the topography of principal–agent relations in
this table from that depicted by defenders of the idea that the World Bank is
the institution able to offer the best type of knowledge for development. For
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instance, Gilbert and Vines argue for the need to strengthen the research role
of the Bank because it is ‘in a position to give advice which is more dis-
interested than that provided by professional consultants, more professional
than that provided by academics and more comprehensive than that provided
by NGOs’ (Gilbert and Vines, 2000: 29). The assumption of Gilbert and
Vines is that the Bank is able to provide research independent of political
pressures and that knowledge generated by the Bank is linear (first knowledge
is created, then it must be subsumed in the process of policy-making). In
support of that view, Lyn Squire, former head of research at the Bank and
currently director of the Global Development Network, claims that in-house
research is needed precisely to avoid principal–agent problems because the
staff of the Bank has an operational mandate. Principal–agent problems
‘would arise if the Bank had to rely on outside research’ (Squire, 2000: 116).
Squire’s analysis bypasses in-house delegation problems that govern a
complex institution like the Bank. Also, Squire presumes the separation of
politics and knowledge that a single focus on principal–agent offers (we must
recall that Guston complements this with a constructivist account of science).
Squire assumes that policy-making is a linear process, thus his argument
supports more the circularity between experts, audience and legitimating of
the expertise pointed out earlier rather than solving the delegatory problems
of the Bank’s knowledge.
Extensive research elaborating a full cartography of boundary principal–
agent relations in an expert bureaucracy like the Bank may be one way to
devise proposals for institutional reform. Also, it can help in determining to
what extent this transnational expert institution may act as a boundary
organization and how far it has to go to accomplish the roles of overcoming
the problems of delegation posed by its research capacities. It also gives us a
basis to establish the possible asymmetric relations of knowledge in all the
principal–agent relations. Addressing ways in which the problems of moral
hazard and adverse selection could be solved may lead to avoiding the
common critique that the Bank contracts intellectual work only with those
who are predisposed to agree with their views and goals. Consequently, it
would be possible to elaborate different types of accountability relations.
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table 1 Principle–agent relations
Principal Agent
Donor countries Recipient countries
Donor countries In-house researchers
Recipient countries Bank
Bank Recipient countries
Bank In-house researchers (grantee dept.)
Bank External consultants
Concluding Remarks: Towards Establishing Salience, Credibility
and Legitimacy
That researchers in the field of environmental science and sustainable
development are turning to use analyses from social science studies is highly
significant. For example, not only is the problem of climate change as ill-
structured, messy and politicized as global poverty, but also the types of
institutions that are formulating knowledge about it have become, like the
Bank, transnational expert institutions. Two significant research initiatives,
the Global Environmental Assessment Project (GEA) and the Network for
Science and Technology for Sustainability (NSTS) have recently examined
the efficiency of global institutions where knowledge and policy about climate
change is elaborated in terms of boundary work and boundary organizations.2
According to these various researchers, the challenges of sustainability and
climate change require a broad notion of knowledge that unveils the political
pressures and consensus building proper of global problems and global part-
ners, while being flexible enough to accommodate many competing views,
political ideologies and values. These research initiatives are elaborating
holistic approaches able to deal with many levels of knowledge, many
competing claims of different stakeholders; systems capable of integrating
disciplines, different functions, changes in space and in time; able to travel
from knowledge to action and vice versa; and elastic enough to adapt to new
circumstances and problems, as well as to the requests of newly integrated
actors. In addition, climate change research needs to account to what extent
knowledge is the outcome of equitable assessments, and to account for the
level of fairness in the evaluation of alternatives in order to achieve proper
policy on such highly contested global issues as greenhouse gas emissions and
their measurement. Social studies of science have helped meet these needs.
Candidate boundary organizations studied by the GEA team are, for example,
the Health Effects Institute (HEI), funded both by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the automobile industry to support research
and regulation about air pollution; the Sea Grant Programme that aims to
mediate between researchers and coastal services; the International Research
Institute for Climate Prediction, which is attempting to create large climate
models that will produce information that is more useable by populations
vulnerable to climate change; and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice (SBSTA), a forum for negotiating ideas and proposals
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
For instance, discussing the characteristics of the SBSTA, Clark Miller
(2001) claims that ‘the three main challenges of the application of science to
global affairs are: first, the contingency and uncertainty inherent in know-
ledge about the global environment; second, the need in global environment
policy context to secure credibility for scientific claims among far-flung, often
highly diverse audiences; and third, the often highly contested moral choices
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embedded in particular systems for producing and warranting policy-relevant
science advice in international organizations’ (Miller, 2001: 247). Theories of
international relations, Miller adds, have tended to assume that the
production of knowledge takes place outside the arena of social analysis, thus
excluding the sources of power in society. But shared knowledge about global
issues as elaborated in international organizations is indeed highly politicized:
. . . a complete understanding of changing patterns of global environmental
governance must investigate not only what happens after ideas acquire consensual
status but also how and why those ideas – and not others – acquired credibility and
authority. . . . [That means] that the processes by which policy-relevant knowledge
is produced, validated, and used to make global policy are part and parcel of the
political foundations of global governance being built in emerging environmental
regimes and must be analyzed as such. (Miller, 2001: 249)
What flows from these authors’ expansion of the boundary approach, as
both entailing processes and institutions, is a model for increasing the
effectiveness of knowledge about highly complex, highly contested and highly
politicized issues. The call is for processes and organizations able to manage
and stabilize accountability, deliberation, participation and equity; able to
generate incentives for accountable knowledge; and able to somehow
challenge the hegemonic position of western institutions and western
researchers – the transnational knowledge elites – while engaging them.
One recommendation this article makes is to create a transnational body
where research on global poverty could be reviewed and coordinated in
analogous ways as knowledge about climate change is managed by the IPCC
and its forum the SBSTA. Many UN agencies besides the Bank have relevant
knowledge about global poverty that is not fully applied, nor is there sufficient
engagement from researchers from the South and little participation of many
stakeholders. Although the Bank has demonstrated an effort to reach out to
its stakeholders, often via civil society organizations and through partnerships
with the private sector, knowledge for policy remains primarily in the hands
of the Bank’s experts. The debate and disagreements are politicized and
polarized leading to the hardening of policy messages, as pointed out by
Kanbur (2001). A model analogous to the IPCC/SBSTA may offer an arena
where all these views are sorted out in a more democratic and accountable
manner and thus lead to more credibility, salience and legitimacy. These
attributes are difficult to achieve as long as knowledge about and for
eradicating global poverty remains in the hands of a single transnational
expert institution. Even though climate change is one of the most politicized
global problems today, the IPCC is viewed as the best functioning provider of
scientific advice in the UN (National Academies, 2002). Global poverty
deserves the same type of attention. Current disagreements about global
poverty call for the successful integration of these judgements so that they
meet the epistemological and normative criteria of multiple expert, policy and
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public audiences. Ideally, global poverty requires sites of co-production where
the relations between science and knowledge are made transparent. Such
institutional mechanisms would need to offer the necessary flexibility and
stability to deal with evolving problems whose descriptions change over time
and across places; institutionalized expertise needs to be able to learn and to
adapt to competing demands while being able to remain stable. Such
institutional mechanisms would have to be able to deconstruct hegemonic
visions and methods, choices and policy decisions and then reconstruct and
renegotiate in a participatory, equitable and fair way with all parties. The aim
is to open up a space for debating the possibility of a more salient, credible and
legitimate knowledge about global poverty, leading to more democratic and
accountable knowledge production, and to a more transparent vision of the
world orders and the values entangled with such knowledge. Yet as difficult
and complex as this role may sound, the alternative is the recognition that
global problems may have to be left to sheer power relations, to Hobbesian
solutions where consensus means that which the most powerful actors want.
Transnational, national and local economic policies decide the lives of
millions of people in both the North and the South. They deserve scrutiny
well beyond the one offered by elite experts.
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notes
1. See Kanbur and Mukherjee’s (2003) ‘Premature Mortality and Poverty
Measurement’. In this paper, the authors claim that poverty trends actually count
those who die of poverty-related causes (identified here as premature mortality)
as reducing the absolute number of poor people (deaths change demographic
numbers). Something, the authors rightly claim, ‘surely violate[s] our basic
intuitions’.
2. The Global Environmental Assessment (GEA), a research project of the John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, is a ‘collaborative,
interdisciplinary effort to explore how assessment activities can better link
scientific understanding with effective action on issues arising in the context of
global environmental change. The project seeks to understand the special
problems, challenges and opportunities that arise in efforts to develop common
scientific assessments that are relevant and credible across multiple national
circumstances and political cultures.’ See Forum for Science and Technology for
sustainability at http://sustsci.harvard.edu/
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résumé
Pauvreté Mondiale: La Co-Production de la Connaissance et la
Politique
Cet article suggère que les idées nées dans le domaine des études sociales sur la science
et la technologie sont pertinentes dans l’évaluation de la connaissance sur le
développement et la pauvreté mondiale élaborée par la Banque Mondiale, même qui a
été très politisée et réfutée. La Banque Mondiale, devenue une institution trans-
nationale de la connaissance, peut être mieux caractérisée en tant que lieu de co-
production des connaissances et d’ordres sociaux. Ce point de vue nous aide à dévoiler
les problèmes d’expertise et de délégation qui sont à la base de rapports entre la
politique et la connaissance. Simultanément, la mise en place des idées venues des
études sociales sur la science et la technologie nous offre un cadre explicatif pour l’avis
scientifique fondé sur la connaissance, ainsi que de suggestions pour accroître la
transcendance, crédibilité et légitimité de cette connaissance. Ce document nous incite
à faire des innovations institutionnelles pour aboutir à un dialogue et débats plus
transparents et responsables entre les différentes parties ayant prétentions aux
connaissances et les vues politiques dedans et dehors les entités transnationales qui
nous offrent leur expérience.
resumen
Pobreza Mundial: La Co-Producción del Conocimiento y la
Política
El presente artículo expone que las ideas procedentes del campo de los Estudios
Sociales de Ciencia y Tecnología son relevantes para la evaluación del conocimiento
en el desarrollo y pobreza mundial, preparado por el Banco Mundial, que ha sido
altamente politizado y refutado. El Banco Mundial, que se ha convertido en una
institución transnacional experta, se puede caracterizar mejor como un ‘lugar de co-
producción’, tanto de conocimiento como de un orden social. Esta perspectiva ayuda
a develar los problemas de experiencia y delegación que son fundamentales en las
relaciones entre política y conocimiento. Paralelamente, la aplicación de las ideas
procedentes de los Estudios Sociales de Ciencia y Tecnología ofrece un marco
explicativo para el asesoramiento científico basado en el conocimiento, y sugerencias
para aumentar la trascendencia, credibilidad y legitimidad de dicho conocimiento. El
presente documento insta a llevar a cabo innovaciones institucionales que puedan
76 Global Social Policy 6(1)
conducir a un diálogo y debate más transparentes y responsables entre diferentes
pretensiones al conocimiento y las visiones políticas dentro y fuera de las entidades
transnacionales que ofrecen su experiencia.
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